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Introduction
The relationship between sports and the economy dates back to the first antique
Olympic Games when athletes were compensated in either goods or species. In the
19th century, gambling on sporting outcomes and the development of first
professional sports paved the way for a sports economy. The attractiveness of
sporting events to the press emerged in the early 20th century, when sport events
have began to be broadcast on radio. It was however, not until after the Second
World War that the genuine globalization of the sporting economy took off. The
said globalization was triggered by three key trends. The first of these trends was
the extension of annually paid holidays for individuals. This led to the engagement
by the society in many leisure activities in all developed market economies, and
sports was now consumed in many forms, such as: sport practice, sporting press
and sport shows.
The second major trend was the television broadcasting of big sporting
events which brought with it a completely new industry which provided access to
TV viewers at any significant international competition convened anywhere around
the world. The last but not least evolution was the current emergence of new
____________________
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information and communication technologies – NICTs (from Internet to mobile
phone and so on) through which images of sporting events can be instantly
transmitted at any moment to any place, throughout the globe.
The result of all this has seen an increasing economic significance of sport
measured by its economic weight compared to GDP. In France for example, a
macroeconomic aggregate, defined as the gross domestic sport expenditure, is
published. It sums up the amounts spent by residents and households in sporting
goods and services with state government sport budget, sport expenditures by local
authorities, sport sponsorship expenses, and TV broadcasting rights raised by sport
event organizers. According to these data, the said aggregate has risen from 0.5%
of GDP in 1971 to 1.77% in 2005, which means Euro 30.4 billion (the same ratio
is between 1 and 2% in most developed countries). However, the relevant market
for many firms involved in the sports economy is no longer a domestic market. It is
definitely a global-wide market. Unfortunately, there is no accounting of the sports
economy at a global level and national accounting of the sports economy is really
developed only in a few developed market economies. Most of the economic data
related to sports which are circulated by mass media are simply rough estimates.
Therefore, the first concern for those economists interested in the sports economy
should be to find ways through which data collection and data creation on all
aspects of globalization in the sporting industry can be improved.
Taking into account the aforesaid limitations on data collection, and despite
these limits, a number of rough estimates on the global market for all sporting
goods and services taken in 2004 was assessed being in the range of Euro 550-600
billion. Global market for football is valued at Euro 250 billion. The market for all
sporting goods is valued about Euro 150 billion. The value of broadcasting rights
related to sport events is estimated at Euro 60 billion while the global market for
sports sponsorship is nearly Euro 18 billion.
In 2006, the global market for doping was assessed at Euro 6 billion.
These figures must however be taken with a pinch of salt as it is crystal clear from
the example hereunder. The widely known estimation of overall international trade
(export) in sporting  goods and equipment in the world is Dollari 2.5 billion in the
year 2004. A recent study1 covering 41 countries involved in this trade and making
up for 96% of the overall sporting goods and equipment exported in the world has
revealed that the real  value could actually have been Dollari 28 billion in 2004, i.e
ten times more. This latter figure is neither an estimate nor a rough figure. It is the
result of a computation achieved with data available from the UN Comtrade data
base. Two lessons must be derived from this example: first, even if media often
tend to exaggerate their estimation of the global sports economy, their estimations
are not always true;. Second, the study of global trade in sports goods is still in its
infancy and must be elaborated on in the future. Regarding the significance of
foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) by multinational companies (henceforth
____________________
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MNCs) in the sports goods industry – a basic determinant of sport economic
globalization –, its estimation is only in the making so far.2
1. Major features of a globalized sports economy
The most globalized features of the sports economy today are represented by: (1)
sports shows and (2) sports mega-events. Since the beginning of XX century there
has been a rapid growth in the number of world or big international sport events
per year: there were 20 sports events in the year 1912, 315 events in 1977, 660 in
1987 and 1,000 in 2005.3 Almost an average of three events per day average! The
audience of such events is increasing on a global scale thanks to TV broadcasting.
In the near future  the question shall be to know whether or not an exponential
growth in the supply of global sport events would exceed the demand of 6 billion
potential TV viewers. The first signs of stagnation in the ratio of sporting audience4
have already emerged in the US.
Globalization of sport events reaches its highest point with genuine global
sport events such as the Olympic Games and football (soccer) World Cups.
Nowadays, their economic significance is more precisely delineated.5 To the contrary,
the economic spill-over of global sporting events in the host countries too often
remains the fallacy of sensational and publicized over-evaluation taking its roots
in methodological tricks or even crude mistakes. One example is the ex-ante
announcement that the rugby World Cup 2007 would have led to a Euro 4 billion
economic spill-over to the French economy. An ex post evaluation, underpinned by
more sound methodological elaborations places this value at Euro 1.4 billion. It is
common knowledge that, since London was awarded the rights to host the 2012
summer Olympics, its actual cost keeps on rising by the day and is currently greater
than any expected benefits there from.
In the worst case, studies on the economic impact of sport events simply
do not rely on any scientific methodology or any analytical approach of investment
decision making. In the best case, they resort to Keynesian multipliers. Unfortunately
they often reflect an insufficient check of double counting, omitted opportunity
costs (i.e. the return of an investment project alternative to hosting the Olympics),
substitution effects (a number of consumers would have paid for another show in
the city had the Olympics not been hosted), and crowding out effects (normally,
tourists avoid Olympic sites due to traffic jams, pollution, etc.) while the local
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population’s willingness to pay is not carefully assessed.
From one global sport event to another, the economic impact of global
sport events is repeatedly affected by the same methodological biases. Why? A
candidate city waits for a study exhibiting an economic gain from hosting a global
sport event in order to win the bid against other candidate cities. And this applies to
all candidates. Consequently, all consulting companies are eager to provide the
expected results, i.e. never a loss, always an ex ante significant economic gain
derived from the event.6 Ex post, it nearly always appears that the event’s final
account is in the red. This is an exemplification of the ‘winners curse’ in sports
economics.
The methodology suggested by sports economists is a cost-benefit analysis
of global sporting events. This is more complex and sophisticated compared to a
simple impact study. It delivers a more accurate and rigorous evaluation of the
spill-over effects and of the net economic value (gain) of a sports event. Such
analysis has been implemented in the above mentioned more realistic evaluation of
the rugby World Cup 2007 in France.7 This type of methodological approach should
globalize itself and prevail as the unique standard, for all researchers in sports
economics at a world level.
The market for TV broadcasting of sporting events is definitely global: big
events are broadcast in 170 to 220 countries each (see Table 1). TV broadcasting
generates or reinforces differentiation, or even discrimination, across the various
sport disciplines: for instance, football always retains the largest coverage. By the
same token, a number of less popular disciplines are simply outmuscled from the
TV screens. Do you remember the last polo or water polo match was aired live on
TV? In fact, television exacerbates all other factors of uneven economic development
across different sports8 due to its media and financial interests in a few privileged
sports.
The greater the audience of a sporting event, the higher the price for an
advertising spot to be broadcast immediately before or during the event or at half
time break. No econometric study has established a clear cut correlation between
TV audiences and number of participants dragged by a given sport discipline so
far, at either a domestic or global level. An intuition is that such a relationship does
exist but it still has to be empirically verified (or falsified). Another feature of the
____________________
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global market for sport broadcasting is that it operates under imperfect competition.
All depends on whether the market is in short supply (excess demand) or short
demand (excess supply). The short side of the market usually imposes its transaction
conditions to those competing together on the long side of the market. The different
forms of the sport broadcasting market are:9 (a) a monopoly when only one organizer
supplies his/her exclusive sports event to competing TV channels (consider the
IOC offering Olympic Games, the FIFA with the football World Cup). In a monopoly
market, price is relatively high, broadcasting rights are expensive and revenues
accruing to the organizer are big; (b) an oligopsonistic monopoly when only one
event organizer is facing very few potential buyers – TV channels (UEFA Champions
League, French football championship). Broadcasting rights are still high though
lower than in the monopoly case due to fewer competitors on the demand side; (c)
a bilateral monopoly which was often the current situation when a single public
TV channel monopolizes the demand side10 of a domestic market or when a European
cartel of public channels (ERU) merged all demands for a sport event to be broadcast
on a European scale. In the case of bilateral monopoly, economic theory teaches
that the transaction price is determined by the relative bargaining power (not
necessarily economic or financial) of the monopoly and the monopsony. Usually
the price is lower than the price emerging in the presence of a pure or oligopsonistic
monopoly; (d) a monopsony when professional clubs are competing for the sale of
their individual broadcasting rights to a single TV channel (French football
championship in the 1970s) instead of the league pooling the rights for all clubs.
Then, in such a case, the lowest price is reached, as well as the lowest revenues for
sport organizers as well, since they are competing on the long side of the market in
the face of a single buyer.
Another outcome of globalization of sport shows and events through TV
broadcasting is a globalization of sport sponsorship. Sponsors of global sport events
are famous MNCs such as Coca Cola, Pepsi, Visa, Mastercard, McDonald’s, Mars,
Kodak, Time-Life, Fuji, Philips, Canon, Panasonic, Xerox… and of course MNCs
involved in the sports goods industry such as Nike, Adidas, Puma, Asics, Mizuno
and so on. Economic analysis of sports sponsorship is now well established.11 A
new trend of ‘naming’ has emerged. In such a case the sponsor’s name or label is
associated with a stadium or a sport arena instead of being attached to an athlete,
a team or a sports contest. A big issue with sports sponsorship emerged when it
started to be linked to global TV broadcasting, which is ambush marketing. For
example, when Linford Christie was interviewed by a number of TV channels
before the 100 meters Olympic final in Atlanta 1996 he was wearing lenses with a
population’s willingness to pay is not carefully assessed.
Puma label while the official sponsor of the Games was Reebok (for a
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Dollari 30 billion entrance fee). An open question is how to find a regulation which
would avoid such distortion of the market or parasitic interference strategy adopted
by those big MNCs involved in sports business.
2. International economic flows in a global sports economy
Trade in sports goods is partly globalized. Chain stores in sports such as Decathlon
and others have spread throughout a large number of countries. Besides, foreign
markets are supplied with exports from home countries where aforementioned
distribution networks and sports goods producers have based their headquarters.
Economic research on  international trade in sports goods remained unheeded for a
long time. A pioneering paper12 had shown that France benefited from an excess
trade balance in sports goods. This was explained by the French net imports of
‘trite’ sports goods – goods which one can use in different sport practices such as
sportswear, sport suit, some sport footwear – being more than compensated for by
France’s net exports of ‘equipment-intensive’ sports goods, which are goods quite
specific to a single sport practice like Alpine skis, cross country skis, windsurfs,
boats, etc. There was no follow up on this study. A first research on international
trade in sports goods led at a global level has recently been published.13 It provides
____________________
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TABLE 1: AUDIENCE OF MAJOR GLOBAL SPORT EVENTS
Sport events Cumulative overall Number of
Broadcasting
audience * Countries
Grand Prix Formula 1, 2000 53,3 206
Football World Cup, 2002 30 220
Football European Championship, 2000 10,7 170
Motor racing World Championship, 2003 5,1 208
Track & fields World Championship, 2003 4,5 200
Summer Olympics, 2004 3,9 220
Rugby World Cup, 2003 3,5 180
Roland-Garros International, 2004 2,7 194
Cycling Tour de France, 2004 1,2 170
* In bn TV viewers.
Source: J.F. Bourg, J.J. Gouguet (2005).Globalization of the sports economy                                                                                      19
to this report, the major partners of EU countries in sports goods trade were other
EU countries in 1994; major partners of NAFTA countries were other NAFTA
countries while the ten most exporting Asian countries imported 50% of their overall
sports goods imports from the same sample of Asian countries. The latter were
nearly all net exporters of sports goods (except Japan) whereas the three NAFTA
countries were net importers. Most of the European countries were net importers
but a few were net exporters (such as Finland, France, Ireland, and Italy). However,
the paper by Harvey and Saint-Germain does not tackle the issue of international
specialization among trade partners participating in global trade in sports goods.
International specialization of major trading countries is addressed in a recent
work.14 Table 2, clearly demonstrates that NAFTA countries, in particular the US,
are net importers of sports goods. To a lesser extent EU countries are also net
importers whereas Asia’s´ emerging countries, especially China, are net exporters
in 2004.
____________________
unequal hierarchy of nations, Sociol. of Sport J., 18, 2001, 231-46.
14 M. ANDREFF, W. ANDREFF, Global Trade in Sports Goods: International Specialisation of Major
Trading Countries, Europ. Sport Man. Quart., 2009, forthcoming.
TABLE 2–GLOBAL TRADE IN SPORTS GOODS BY AREA AND SOME SIGNIFICANT
COUNTRIES
(IN % OF TOTAL)
1994 1999 2004
Area Export Import Export Import Export Import
NAFTA 13,6 36,6 15,3 34,6 10,6 32,1
European Union * 34,8 37,9 34,7 40,8 33,1 44,8
Transition countries 2,8 0,6 3,7 1,3 3,5 2,6
Asia 44,9 24,2 42,4 22,4 49,1 19,7
other emerging countries 3,8 0,7 3,8 0,9 3,8 0,8
Countries Export Import Export Import Export Import
United States 9,9 32,0 10,2 29,4 7,0 27,2
Germany 5,0 12,5 5,0 9,9 4,8 8,5
Italy 7,5 3,1 7,0 3,9 5,8 5,2
Czech Republic 0,6 0,2 0,6 0,5 0,9 0,7
China 16,7 0,4 21,6 0,5 33,6 0,7
Tunisia 2,0 0,2 2,3 0,3 2,7 0,2
* Plus Switzerland
Source: M. Andreff, W. Andreff
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A more detailed analysis exhibits that developed market economies have
only few comparative advantages which concentrate on global trade of ‘equipment-
intensive’ goods, primarily skis, ski equipment, boats, windsurfs, golf equipment
and table tennis. Emerging countries have a quite significant comparative advantage
in sportswear and footwear, anoraks, balls, rackets, skates and gymnastic equipment,
i.e. on average in ‘trite’ sports goods with a lower value added in production. A
next step would be the analysis of the determinants of these international
specialization patterns, the role of demand and unit production costs, namely the
relationship between labour-intensive sports goods (trite goods) and capital-intensive
and research-intensive sports goods (equipment-intensive goods).
The production of sports goods has globalized although we still lack detailed
knowledge in relation to this and the underlying international economic flows which
triggers this, i.e. the phenomenon of FDI. The breakdown of available data regarding
FDI is not detailed enough to precisely detect foreign investments undertaken in
the sports goods industry. If one wants to assess the role of FDI and MNCs in
globalization of the sports economy, there are two ways which can be followed.
The first way  is by observing the rates at which trite sports goods are re-
exported back to their home base developed market economies, as well as the re-
exports from developing and emerging countries where foreign subsidiaries and
production had been relocated by MNCs.15 The second means consists of writing
monographs about MNCs involved in sports goods. For instance, Salomon (then
merged into Adidas) or Rossignol (now merged into Quicksilver) had invested
abroad, in North American and European countries in order to supply fast growing
and wealthy domestic markets – the tool here was a so-called horizontal FDI geared
towards consumer demand. On the other hand, firms like Adidas, Puma, Lafuma
and others invested abroad (primarily in Eastern Europe, Maghreb and Asia) in
order to lower their production costs by means of a vertical FDI (diminishing input
costs, for example unit labour costs). Pursuing the same goal, Nike, Reebok, and
Mizuno have adopted a different strategy of production relocation in low-cost
countries without any FDI; they signed international subcontracting arrangements
with Asian producers and, consequently, developed outward processing trade from
emerging countries, in particular in trite sports goods trade. Nike went furthest in
this strategy and became a hollow corporation having no longer any sports goods
production in the US where the firm concentrates on conception, design, marketing,
distribution and financial activities. All Nike sports goods are manufactured by
Asian subcontractors (mainly Indonesian, Pakistani and Chinese) and labeled ‘Nike’
afterwards. More research is needed to go deeper into the analysis of various MNCs
strategies in a globalized sports goods industry.
The market for high-level sporting talents has also globalized. It is a labour
market in which professional players and other highly talented athletes are
____________________
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internationally transferred – from a club in one country to a club located abroad.
International transfers of football players skyrocketed in this global labour market
since it was entirely de-regulated by the Bosman case in 1995. The latter was
followed up with Malaja, Kolpak and Simutenkov cases, as well as the Cotonou
agreement signed between the EU and 77 Asian-Caribbean-Pacific countries, which
extended the globalization of labour market to other sports than football and to
various areas of the world economy.  Football has of late recently become the most
investigated global market in the sports economy, given rising concerns over the
transfer of teenagers players below the age of 18; which brought about new research
in the 2000s.
The transfers of teenage players is illegal and is undertaken under outrageous
and infamous conditions offered to young players.16 The increasing turnover in the
labour force and the growing international mobility of athletes continues to be felt
and annually destabilizes the manpower of many sport teams, with the exception
of the richest. Such consequences of free movement in a global market call for the
re introduction  of certain regulations.17 The ultimate consequence in some countries
could see domestic sports losing its control as a result of the transfer balance (the
difference between players transferred abroad and those transferred from abroad)
as happened in French professional football in the early 2000s.
Another outcome is the emergence of an underground (black) market for
teenage players after the introduction of new FIFA regulations released in 2001.
These regulations prohibit the transfer of players below the age of 18. An alternative
regulation, suggested to be spread to all sports, not only football, has been designed
following the model of a Tobin tax on short term international capital movements
(which are typical of financial globalization).
Coined as the “Coubertobin” tax,18 this proposed new regulation is
conceived in such a way as to curb on international player mobility as a function of
age when international transfes are effected (namely, the younger the age of the
player transferred the higher the tax rate due from the transfer). Tax revenues
would accrue an international fund for sport development in developing countries
where teenage players have been discovered, trained and educated. Introducing
such a tax is not envisaged so far, but it would be meaningless to adopt the tax
without a tighter supervision of the activities of player´s agents. Most player´s
agents involved in international transfers are not even registered at the FIFA or
____________________
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17 The most publicised call is the one by Mr. Sepp Blatter (a former UEFA top manager) in favour
of a so-called 6 + 5 rule, meaning that any football team must field a squad with six native of the
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the Bosman jurisprudence and has no chance to be implemented against the law (the Treaty of
Rome article which guarantees international labour mobility to all EU citizens). Something more
sophisticated is to be thought of.
18 W. ANDREFF, The taxation of player moves from developing countries, in R. Fort, J. Fizel,
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their domestic football federation, and therefore are in some sense ‘outlaw’ agents.
What is urgently needed is to build up an exhaustive data collection process about
all international transfers (in all sports) and incurred financial amounts; the latter
is absolutely unknown and is only known to the public through estimates and
speculation by journalists or through acquaintances with some players.
Finally, globalization of the sports economy is exploited by all those who
are involved into the worst financial misdoings, embezzlements, money launderings,
etc., in which global sports are drifting. Here researchers, and of course citizens,
face a genuine terra incognita. We tried to put up an economic analysis of globalized
financial misbehaviors, although this has yet to be well elaborated.19 One basic
limitation is that juridical expertise must go hand in hand with the economist
competences in order to tackle such issues as match fixing and referee corruption;
both of which are growing at the same pace as illicit international betting and
gambling on sport events which have accelerated by resorting to NICTs. For
example, Asian punters can bet on incredible or aberrant (thus entirely unpredictable)
match outcomes in a European Champions League contest and, at the same time,
can invest in bribing one goalkeeper, other players or the referee participating to
this contest; this is of course to facilitate the reach of an absolutely unpredictable
(but extremely profitable to these punters) match outcome. A real economic research
on this area is yet to start since it is not really feasible as a result of hidden information
about illicit behaviors. It is however  a concern which should at least stimulate
more empirical investigation.
International money laundering is also exploiting sport-related flow as one
of its channels. Some official bodies are in charge of chasing money launderers
such as the Group of Financial Action – GFIA – against money laundering (at
OECD level) or, in France, Tracfin (a specialized department of the Ministry for
Finance) and other departments in central government.20 International capital
transfers move dirty money to be invested in sport abroad and utilizes globalization
of financial transactions as a way of cleaning funds whose origins are suspicious,
if not stolen or illegally acquired (one of the first ‘laundry’ for Russian dirty money
has been  the Italian cycling team Roslotto by 1992-94). International transfers
enable capital owners to acquire, clean and polish a worldwide notoriety, which
was one of the motives behind Abramovich’s purchase of Chelsea FC as well as
other Russian ‘oligarchs’ buying clubs in European football. This is only the tip of
the iceberg and more information needs to be collected to check how much sport
serves the aims of a global financial black market.
Last but not least, economic analysis of doping has already been
theoretically deepened.21 Anti-doping control is in progress and it goes along with
____________________
19 W. ANDREFF, Financing Modern Sport in the Face of a Sporting Ethic, Europ. J. for Sport
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20 N. PONS, Cols blancs et mains sales. Economie criminelle, mode d’emploi, Odile Jacob, Paris,
2006.
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increased data collection and athlete testing at a global level (namely the role of the
World Anti-Doping Agency). Doping substances are often traded across national
borders. Economists should pay attention to this dark side of global trade connected
to sport.
3. Globalization as geographical spread of the sports economy
Economic globalization of specific sporting practices and services offered to sport
participants is less advanced. A limited though increasing number of sport disciplines
fits with development outside their country of origin: skiing, mountain climbing,
sailing, canyoning, trekking, rally raid and so on. The result is a consumption of
sport services (sport equipment rental, instructors, coaches, guides) abroad, i.e. an
international spread of sport consumption. At this point, economic globalization of
the sports economy overlaps with globalization of tourism.
The sports economy geographically spreads also to new countries when a
new sport discipline settles down in a country being imported from a different
country. European football (soccer) entered the US market in the 1980s. The other
way round, baseball and American football penetration is more recent in European
markets. Other examples trace us back to the history of sports: football and rugby
were exported from England to France and continental Europe in the late 19th
century, English cricket was transferred to India, table tennis, judo and other martial
arts moved from Asia to the rest of the world, frisbee moved abroad from the US,
and so on. All economic activities associated with these sports had geographically
spread as well.
A last channel for globalization is simply when the sports economy itself
extends to new countries where it has not been played before (former colonies,
developing countries). A variant is expansion of a market-based sports economy
towards former communist countries in which sports activities and associated
economic flows were state-run and state-owned. National pride, international
competition in sport, and other non economic factors tend to attract talents, human
capital, money and finance into the sport sector in all countries. But here we can
talk about an ‘uneven globalization’ of the sports economy or an uneven development
of sport globalization since the sports economy grows (or decreases) nearly at the
same pace as GDP in most countries in the world.
The sports economy has obviously extended into the developing countries
but its growth is hindered there by underdevelopment of physical and sport activities.
The underdevelopment is tightly correlated to economic underdevelopment.22 The
rate of participation in sports (i.e. the percentage of sport participants in the overall
____________________
BOURG, Contribution à une analyse économique du dopage, Reflets et perspective de la vie
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population) is low in developing countries, between 0.1% and 10% whereas it is
over 25% in any developed market economy whatever the measurement methodology
used. Such a gap in less developed countries is mainly due to low physical education
at school (even though it is scheduled in class hours and educative programs).
Eventually, the lack of sport teachers and facilities leads to a shortened and less
intense physical education which sometimes reduces to zero.23 Given the shortage
of coaches and sports health care, only a few developing African countries are able
to secure a continuous domestic championship in most sports, with the exception
of football. The Central government and local authorities’ sport financing is quite
limited by very hard budget constraints in countries where more urgent priorities
(malnutrition, health, basic education) need  more financial attention. Sports facilities
and infrastructures are so few that most developing countries cannot afford to host
global sporting events.24 Coupling this are the large income gaps which propel the
best athletes from developing countries to expatriate into wealthy leagues in
developed countries (or oil-endowed countries) and, increasingly, to request their
naturalization – the citizenship of their host country.25 For example, Qatar is building
up an Olympic team based on naturalized athletes and players, because it appears
possible for any person to obtain Qatari citizenship within a fortnight. Wilson
Kipketer, a former Kenyan citizen, participated at the Beijing Olympics representing
the Danish team. Economic globalization of sport jeopardizes the very notion and,
possibly, the future of national squads.
Economic underdevelopment of sport in a context of globalization comes
out with uneven probability of winning global (international) sport contests, the
number of wins depending on the level of economic development in athletes’ home
countries. A dozen of econometric tests have already verified such statement of
which the last one26 confirms that the number of medals won is basically determined
by a nation’s GDP per capita and population, and by the fact that a country hosted
the Olympic Games. Some additional variables improve the explanation of medals
won, such as the political regime, regional differences in sport culture (habits) in a
nation, and athletes’ specialization in some Olympic disciplines, different from one
country to the other.
In the 1990s, UNESCO launched a research program focused on sport in
Africa´s least developed countries which aimed at identifying the main obstacles to
sport development and was envisaging increased co-operation between developed
____________________
23 Y. SOUCHAUD, Situation sportive dans les pays moins avancés d’Afrique: bilan, Division de la
Jeunesse et des Activités Sportives, Paris, UNESCO, 1995.
24 W. ANDREFF, Sport in developing countries, in W. Andreff, S. Szymanski, (eds.), Handbook on
the Economics of Sports, cit., 304-15.
25 W. ANDREFF, (2006d), Pistes de réflexion économique, in D. Oswald, (ed.), La nationalité dans
le sport. Enjeux et problèmes, Editions du Centre International d’Etude du Sport, Université de
Neuchâtel, 2006, 171-91.
26 M. ANDREFF, W. ANDREFF, S. POUPAUX, Les déterminants économiques de la performance
olympique: Prévision des médailles gagnées aux Jeux de Pékin, Rev. d’Econ. Pol., vol. 118, n. 2,
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and least developed countries. Since then very few researches have emerged in this
area of uneven sport globalization, in particular to test a significant relationship
between a low level of sport and economic development on the one hand and, on
the other hand, the quality of sport performances at global level.
In post-communist transition countries, the major issue is not international
sport performance. When these countries were ruled by a communist regime, they
were gaining a number of Olympic medals quite higher than the one predicted from
their GDP per capita and population (they were outliers in all econometric
regressions). Such specificity was explained by their capacity to mobilize (sometimes
in a nearly military way) very significant human and financial resources in favour
of preparing and training athletes in the framework of a state centralized sport
organization, leaving no room to market mechanisms.27
Transition to a market economy, coupled with an economic crisis in its
early years, led to a lower international sport performance in the whole former
Soviet area. However, such a decrease did not affect the relative weight of those
countries with respect to the rest of the world. In fact, the hypothesis of a (formal
and informal) institutional inertia in the functioning of East-European sports
systems, while economic institutions were transformed in depth into a market
economy, has been empirically confirmed.28 The accession of ten Central Eastern
European countries to the European Union in 2004 and 2007 has increasingly
brought into line their sport organization and financing systems with those of Western
Europe.29
Economic globalization of sport probably would not have grown so fast
without the relaxed attitude of sports governing bodies towards the big influx of
money into sport at global level. The IOC´s U-turn in the 1980s is to be stressed
here. As from 1981, the IOC no longer required an athlete participating in the
Olympic Games to have an amateur status. It thereafter legalised the exploitation
of its brand (i.e. Olympic symbols) in commercial business in 1986.
International sport federations have adopted money-attracting strategies
geared towards sponsors and the media in order to increase the number of their
affiliated national federations and their individual members, so that their international
championships or cups and the latter’s audience become really global. In 2001, the
volleyball international federation accounted for 218 affiliated national federations,
____________________
27 S. POUPAUX, Soviet and post-soviet sport, W. Andreff, S. Szymanski, (eds.) 316-24, S. POUPAUX,
Performances économiques et transformations du secteur sportif dans les pays est-européens.
Une contribution à l’économie du sport, Ph. D dissertation, University Paris 1, December 2006.
28 W. ANDREFF, S. POUPAUX, The institutional dimension of the sports economy in transition
countries, in M.M. Parent, T. Slack, (eds.), International Perspectives on the Management of
Sport, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007, 99-124.
29 This is one conclusion of a (not yet published) report on public and private financing of sport
in the 27 EU member countries. The report was sponsored by the French Ministry for Sports and
will be published by the end of 2008, AMNYOS CONSULTING, W. ANDREFF, Public and Private
Financing of Sport in Europe, preliminary report to be submitted to the meeting of EU sports
ministers, Biarritz, 27 November, 2008.26                                                                                                                     Wladimir Andreff
211 in basketball, 210 in track and fields, 204 in football (soccer), 190 in tennis
and amateur boxing, 186 in table tennis, 179 in judo, 176 in swimming, 169 in
cycling.30 The number of national Olympic Committees has increased from 7 in
1900 to 46 in 1936, 130 in 1972, and 202 in 2004. They benefit from growing IOC
revenues and expenses.31
4. Globalization of professional sports
The economic globalization of professional sports obviously underlies globalization
of sport shows and events. Its pace is accelerating more in European sports than in
typical North American sports. Unlike european football, Baseball and American
football had not yet conquered 204 countries in the world, despite some marketing
and media strategies by the Major League Baseball and National Football League
oriented towards European markets. An assumption to be further confirmed with
empirical evidence is that globalization of professional sports is differentiated
between the two shores of the Atlantic due to their different organization and
regulation. In North America, we witness a closed league system contrasting with
a European open league system.32
A closed league is a cartel of all clubs participating into a championship.
No team is either promoted to a higher league (or division) at the end of season;at
the same time, no one is relegated to a lower league either. The league maximizes
collective revenues of all clubs through pooling the sale of broadcasting rights,
thus monopolizing supply in the broadcasting market.
Under the Sports Broadcasting Act (1961), American professional sports
are exempted from enforcement of anti-trust law in this market; at this date, they
already were exempted in the labour market for talents, in which leagues had a
monopsony situation restricting players’ inter-club mobility. The league provides
its own economic regulation. The first fundamental measure is entry barrier into
the league: a team owner who applies to an expansion franchise in one major
league must convince all incumbent league members (owners) that his/her entrance
will substantially increase overall league revenues and profits. If accepted in the
league, the new member has to pay a very high franchise; moreover, the league
(Commissioner) will have the last word about the team’s geographical location.
Fort contends that a closed league system generates a quantitative rationing
process.33 The number of teams in an American league is usually lower than the
one requested by fans and spectators, namely a demand level which would be
satisfied in a league open to economic competition. Three signs of a shortage or
____________________
30 J.F. BOURG, J.J. GOUGUET, Economie du sport, 2005, Repères 309, Paris: La Découverte.
31 J.L. CHAPPELET., The economics of the IOC, in W. Andreff, S. Szymanski, (eds.), Handbook on
the Economics of Sports, cit., 241-53.
32 W. ANDREFF, Régulation et institutions en économie du sport, Revue de la Régulation:
Capitalisme, Institutions, Pouvoirs, n. 1, juin, 2007, Varia 27 p.
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rationing organized by a closed league are: (1) some rival leagues had emerged, at
least for some time, in all American professional sports; (2) each time a league
opens a new expansion franchise, a great number of potential candidates are queuing
to enter; (3) leagues and clubs are capable of price discrimination among spectators
without loosing attendance. The regulation of the league is not countervailed by
competitive threat of a takeover via financial markets, as in other American
industries, since American teams are not listed in the stock exchange. They are not
exposed to hostile (or even friendly) acquisitions, mergers or raiders.
The closed league monopoly power in its product market is augmented
with a monopsony power in its major input (labour) market. In the 1970s, veteran
players obtained, after a number of strikes, the status of free agents. Coupled with
a high rate of player unionization, this evolution tended to fuel wage inflation. In
order to curb wage inflation, a salary cap was introduced in National Basketball
Association and National Football League. A maximum payroll is fixed through
collective bargaining between owners and player trade unions as a given percentage
of overall league revenues that accrues to players. Dividing the league payroll
across teams, the maximum payroll is fixed for each team. Thus, all teams must
adjust by either handling payrolls or adapting the number of players (namely
superstars) downwards. Such a rule is supposed to prevent the richer teams from
“grabbing” all the best players and deteriorating too much the league’s competitive
balance.
Another regulation, the rookie draft, is entirely devoted to maintaining a
balanced competition. The rules of the draft system prohibit the entrance in major
league of new young players (rookies) and players from college teams, minor leagues
or from abroad. Players are ranked by experts on a draft according to their past
sporting performances (an assessment of their talents). It is a reverse-order-of-
finish draft.34 The team which has been the last ranked at end of the past
championship has a priority choice for players to be hired (thus this team is supposed
to choose the best player) while the past season’s champion is the last team to
choose and hire a player ranked down the draft (supposedly one of the weakest
player). Obviously, this rule has been designed to maintain competitive balance
but it also spreads the league monopsony power to all players who have not even
signed a first time with a professional team before. Finally, an American sport
league is regulated through revenue sharing which reduces the gap between big
rich and poor small teams in terms of gate receipts and broadcasting rights. In a
nutshell, a closed league is an exception to the liberal and competitive credo within
American capitalism.
However, a closed league does not forbid and does not really hinder
international mobility of players. On the other hand, it is not open to international
team mobility. North American teams which had won the major league baseball
championship never confronted afterwards non-American teams in an international
____________________
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contest. There is no vertical mobility of teams up to a global level. The only team
mobility which occurs in a closed league is horizontal and geographical. A team
can move from an American city to another one within a same major league. On
the contrary, European football is open upwards for clubs to qualify for an
international contest with the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Cup which
are broadcast at global level.
In an open league system, the club content of a championship changes
from season to season. A hierarchical organization is maintained by means of a
promotion-relegation system. As to the principle, a club can move upwards from
the lowest local amateur contest to a nation-wide professional championship and
eventually qualify for European Champions League. Or a club can fall down the
ladder. Its route in the hierarchy only depends on its sporting performance. Club
mobility is vertical from league 1 to league 2 to league 3, etc. (or the other way
round); usually, there is no geographical mobility. The utility function of a club in
an open league is win-maximization in order to be promoted (or avoid relegation)
under a budget constraint which consists in being in the black.35 In fact, all clubs
invest in player talents before the beginning of season in view of winning the
championship; but all clubs cannot be champions or well ranked at the end of
season and, therefore, gate receipts and TV revenues will not cover ex post payroll
costs in loosing clubs. Sporting competition prevails over economic competition in
an open league. The latter also calls for some regulation to sustain fan interest, but
much less than in a closed league for two reasons. Firstly, relegation keeps the
weakest clubs out of the league at end of each season by ‘sending’ them down in a
lower league, and promotion adds the best clubs from a lower league to the upper
league. Thus, the promotion-relegation system operates as a self-regulation
mechanism which restores competitive balance season after season. Secondly, the
fan interest in a championship is maintained up to the end (contrary to a closed
league) by the race to be promoted or relegated. The only games without too much
interest are matches between middle ranked clubs by the end of season because
they are no longer threatened with relegation and no longer have the chance to be
promoted.
The ultimate objective of major European (for instance football) clubs is
to qualify as regularly as possible for international (European) contests and this
has transformed them into real multinational businesses or companies. Such
statement may seem paradoxical since it is not possible to markedly globalize a
club’s basic product which is a match offered in a stadium (moreover it is a joint
____________________
35 In practice, a number of European professional clubs are actually in the red. In particular,
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product created with the contesting club). An Italian football stadium may attract
some foreign spectators, namely some European (non Italian) fans when a
Champions League match is offered, but on average they are few compared to the
Italian fans. On the other hand, a club’s indirect product is the sport show that can
be broadcast and, by the same token, can meet instant globalization of its TV
viewers. Champions League matches are broadcast far beyond European borders.
Globalization of derived products such as merchandising, club touring for
demonstration matches in Asia and so on, is also easy to achieve for spreading the
number of club’s fans all around the world, as for instance Manchester United is
used to do. However, it is globalization of its major factors of production and
finance which transforms a European football club playing in the Champions League
into a MNC. Such clubs are used to fielding squads with players of different
nationalities (once Chelsea FC played a match in which they fielded players from
eleven different countries) and to hire foreign coaches and managers. Their labour
force is multinational. In relation to finance, a significant evolution occurred when
a so-called SSSL model of financing from the 1980s and before vanished – in
which the major sources of finance were the spectators (gate receipts), subsidies
and sponsors of local or domestic origin.36 Today, all big European professional
clubs have adopted a MCMMG model of finance: the most significant source of
finance definitely is TV revenues; new incomes are drawn from corporations
(entrepreneurs, oligarchs, etc.) acting as patrons, merchandising and markets –
both labour market on which talents are sold for some revenues and capital market,
i.e. the stock exchange where some clubs are listed.37 All these new sources of
finance are potentially or really global. Gate receipts and subsidies are no longer
prevailing modes of finance. With MCMMG model, there is no reason why players,
coaches, managers, sponsors, patrons, fans and owners would have a same
nationality. The contrary is everyday more obvious. Even club ownership is
globalizing: Chelsea FC is owned by a Russian citizen, Manchester United by an
American investment fund, Grenoble Football Club by a Japanese company (Index)
and so on. A logical consequence of professional clubs’ globalization could be the
emergence of a European (world?) league gathering all the best clubs. In 1998,
Media Partners supported by other patrons involved in the media business like
Berlusconi, Murdoch and Léo Kirch, made a proposal to create a European football
Super league comprising 36 of the richest European football clubs. The Super
league was supposed to generate revenues twenty times bigger than that generated
by the UEFA Champions League. Though European, this project was of a global
vintage. Media Partners’ attempt failed because UEFA instantaneously reformed
the Champions League, invested bigger gains to the participating clubs, and accepted
some decision sharing with them. In basketball however, a European super league
____________________
36 W. ANDREFF, P. STAUDOHAR, The Evolving European Model of Professional Sports Finance, J. of
Sp. Econ., vol. 1, n. 3, 2000, 257-76.
37 M. AGLIETTA, W. ANDREFF, B. DRUT, Bourse et football, Revue d’Economie Politique, vol. 118, n.
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actually emerged.
The question is to know whether or not , becoming MNCs, professional
clubs are already organized and managed as such. Financial crisis that European
football is muddling through38 raises some doubt about whether better governance
and better financial management are now required in the industry of professional
sports as in any other globalised industry.39 The legacy from amateur sport managed
by voluntary workers and financed by benevolent patrons has faded away in
European high level sport leagues and clubs.
Conclusion
All the dimensions involved in globalization of the sports economy, in particular
the fragment of professional sports, shows how promising this area is for a research
on sports economics. Even if the latter is now covered by the Handbook of Sport
Economics40 gathering 86 chapters and 63 authors, and by an increasing number
of articles in economic journals, the issue of economic globalization in the sport
sector remains somewhat unheeded and calls for further publications.
____________________
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crisis of European football.
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